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Private Federal Tax Rulings Are Governed by Standard of 
Equality and Fairness of Internal Revenue Code, Section 
7805 (b )-International Business Machines Corp. v. 
United States* 
In a private ruling the Commissioner of Internal Revenue con-
cluded that cettain computers produced by Remington Rand, Inter-
national Business Machines' sole competitor in the manufacture of 
that type of computer, were not subject to a previously imposed 
excise tax.1 IBM immediately requested a similar ruling concerning 
• 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl.), rehearing denied, - F.2d - (Ct. Cl. 1965) [hereinafter 
cited as principal case]. 
I. INT. REv. ConE 0'1! 1954, § 4191 (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3406(a)(6)). 
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its identical machines. After a- 2½-year delay, the Commissioner 
ruled adversely on IBM's request and at the same time prospectively 
withdrew the favorable ruling from Remington.2 IBM thereupon 
sued to recover the tax paid during the period Remington enjoyed 
the exemption.3 The Court of Claims held, one judge dissenting, 
that when two taxpayers ask for identical private rulings, but the 
Commissioner rules favorably only as to one, the Commissioner 
abuses the discretion granted to him by section 7805(b) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code4 if he later reinstates the tax as to the favored 
taxpayer prospectively only, without refunding to the other tax-
payer the taxes paid during the period of discrimination. 
The Commissioner. of Internal Revenue regularly issues private 
rulings to individual taxpayers who request an interpretation of 
the Internal Revenue Code as it applies to their particular fact 
situations.5 These rulings do not have the status of law; rather, 
they are designed to enable the Commissioner to reflect his current 
opinion regarding the tax Iaw.6 A ruling embodying an incorrect 
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code is considered a mere 
nullity. A subsequent ruling promulgating the correct interpreta-
tion retroactively supersedes its erroneous predecessor, absent some 
special statutory provision othenvise, for, in the absence of such a 
provision, the Commissioner lacks the power to deviate from the 
statute.7 Because of the potential retroactive effect of a corrective 
ruling, it is immediately apparent that the holders of discredited 
private_ rulings who have refrained from paying taxes in reliance 
upon their rulings might well owe substantial sums to the govern-
ment. To remedy this inequity,8 Congress enacted section 7805(b) 
2. It is not disputed that IBM's machines are properly within the scope of § 4191. 
Principal case at 917. , 
3. IBM's right to recover that portion of the excise tax passed on to its customers 
was conditional upon its obtaining the consent of those customers in accordance with 
the provisions of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6416(a)(l). 
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7805(b) provides: "Retroactivity of regulations or 
rulings.-The Secretary or his delegate may prescribe the extent, if any, to which 
any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied 
without retroactive effect." 
5. Rev. Proc. 28, 1962-2 Cu11r. BULL. 496, 497. A "private" ruling should be dis-
tinguished from a "published" ruling, the latter being published in the Revenue 
Bulletin for the benefit and use of taxpayers at large. 
6. Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 297 U.S. 129, 135 (1936). 
7. See authorities cited note 6 supra. 
8. See H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1921); S. REP. No. 275, 67th 
, Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1921), which states that the Act of November 23, 1921, § 1314, 
42 Stat. 314 (the predecessor of § 7805(b)), "authorizes the Commissioner [to issue] a 
regulation or Treasury decision which reverses a prior regulation or Treasury decision 
.•• without retroactive effect." ("Rulings" were later included within this discretionary 
power by the Act of May 10, 1934, § 506, 48 Stat. 757.) Sec H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1939); S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1939), explaining 
~at the. Commissioner is to use this discretion to avoid inequity where it would 
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of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides the Commissioner 
with discretionary authority to forego retroactive application of 
corrective interpretations. Generally, however, when the Commis-
sioner issues rulings reversing earlier favorable private rulings, non-
retroactive treatment is made available under section 7805(b) only 
to the holders of the favorable private rulings, and not to taxpayers 
relying upon private rulings issued to others.9 
In the principal case the Court of Claims, unable to find ~ore 
appropriate statutory language to support its result, resorted to a 
rathe~ imaginative application of section 7805(b).10 Although IBM 
had never held a favorable private ruling on this matter, the court 
nevertheless allowed recovery, reasoning that IBM, having taken the 
trouble to apply promptly for its own ruling, was entitled to the 
same treatment that its competitor, Remington, had received.11 How-
otherwise occur if a new interpretation were applied "to past transactions which have 
been closed by taxpayers upon existing practice." 
At present, the general policy of the Internal Revenue Service is not to revoke 
a private ruling retroactively except in certain rare circumstances. Rev. Proc. 28, 
1962·2 CuM, BULL. 496, 505; Rev. Rul. 164, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 88, 91. The courts 
have enforced this policy, holding that the Commissioner may be found to have abused 
the discretion vested in him by § 7805(b) when he retroactively revokes a favorable 
private ruling upon which the holder has relied. See, e.g., Lesavoy Foundation v. 
Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956). See also Automobile Club of Michigan v. 
Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1957), which held that the Commissioner cannot be 
equitably ·estopped to apply retroactively a revocation of a ruling when the original 
ruling embodied a mistake of law, but that the Commissioner's action may be dis-
turbed if he abuses the discretion vested in him by § 379l(b) (the predecessor of 
§ 7805(b)). See generally Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as 
Applied Against the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAX ~- REv. 
487 (1964). 
9. Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 686 (1962); Bornstein v. United 
States, 345 F.2d 558 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Minchin v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 30, 32-33 (2d Cir. 
1964); Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959); Goodstein v. Commissioner, 
267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959); Gerstell v. Commissioner, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ~ 62181 
(1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. l!l63); Arnold A. Schwartz, 40 T.C. 191 (1963); Bennet 
v. Commissioner, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ~ 60253 (1960). Where taxpayers without private 
ruliugs have alleged discrimination because they were not given the same favorable 
treatment accorded similarly situated taxpayers with private rulings, the courts have 
denied relief, holding that the fact a taxpayer secured a ruling is, in itself, a sufficient 
basis for allowing preferential treatment. Weller v. Commissioner, supra; Arnold A. 
Schwartz, supra (by implication). 
10. The court apparently felt it necessary to base recovery on statutory grounds 
in order to alleviate IBM's burden of showing damages, a burden which the court 
implied would have to be imposed if it were to resort to "principles of estoppel 
evolved judicially as part of a limited 'common law' effort to further fairness." Principal 
case at 925. 
11. Principal case at 924. In Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558 (Ct. CI. 
1965), handed down by the Court of Claims one month after the principal case, the 
plaintiff neglected to request a private ruling and therefore lost the case: "In [Inter-
national Business Machines Corp. v. United States] •.. the court applied Section 7805(b) 
·, •• in behalf of a taxpayer who had made prompt application to obtain a private rul-
ing to the same effect as a ruling issued to another taxpayer, which manufactured and 
sold business machines that were similar in all material respects to the machines 
manufactured by plaintiff. In [Bornstein v. United States] ••• , none of the taxpayers 
••• asked for rulings." Id. at 564 n.2. 
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ever, because IBM's request for a private ruling holding its com-
puters nontaxable was never granted, there was never a threat to 
IBM that a subsequent ruling would retroactively impose a tax not 
previously levied. IBM paid the tax throughout the period in ques-
tion, and the Commissioner's later ruling merely articulated the 
assumption upon which both IBM and the Service had been acting 
-that IBM's computers were taxable. The court seems to have ar-
bitra;ily assumed, however, that the ruling rejecting IBM's applica-
tion for an exemption was somehow "retroactive."12 The court then 
proceeded to find that the Commissioner had abused his discretion 
under section 7805(b) because he did not make this ruling non-
retroactive like the ruling reinstating the tax upon Remington.18 Al-
though the court devised what it felt to be an adequate basis for 
the application of section 7805(b), the statute is simply not con-
structed to provide a general means of recovery where the Com-
missioner's refusal to grant a favorable private ruling results in 
discrimination.14 As previously indicated, application of section 
7805(b) is wholly dependent upon an eventual adverse private 
ruling which may be construed to have retroactive effect; there is 
no necessary correlation, however, between retroactive effect and 
arbitrary discrimination.111 If, for example, the Commissioner, instead 
12. Principal case at 921. The court's conclusion seems to be that all adverse rulings, 
regardless of whether they reflect a change in the Commissioner's interpretation of 
the tax laws, are "retroactive" unless the Commissioner makes them "nonretroactive" 
by refunding truces paid prior to the issuance of the ruling. 
13. The Commissioner was forced to make the ruling as to Remington Rand 
nonretroactive, because the Revenue Act of 1926, § 1108(b), 44 Stat. 9, 114, forbids the 
levying of a true on any article sold if at the time of sale there was a ruling holding 
the sale nontaxable. 
14. Two cases were cited by the court for the proposition that recovery of back 
taxes is allowed if the Commissioner makes a ruling retroactive as to the plaintiff-
taxpayer, but nonretroactive as to others without a rational basis for the distinction. 
Exchange Parts Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 251 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Connecticut Ry. & 
Lighting Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 907 (Ct. Cl. 1956). However, both are dis-
tinguishable from the principal case because each involved a reversal by the Commis-
sioner of a tax exemption policy applicable to the public at large, rather than a refusal 
to grant a private ruling. Unlike the plaintiffs in both of the cited cases, IBM never 
fell within the reach of any expression by the Service holding its products nontaxable, 
15. The principal case leaves unanswered the further question whether, in the 
absence of a reply by the Commissioner, IBM might have brought an action for man• 
damus or mandatory injunction in a federal district court to compel the Commissioner 
to issue a ruling. The only possible limitation upon the Commissioner's discretionary 
right to refuse to issue a ruling seems to lie within the language of § 7805(a) of the Int. 
Rev. Code of 1954, which authorizes the Commissioner to issue "needful" rules and 
regulations. Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 81, 109 (1964). Nevertheless, since the language is 
that of authorization and not of requirement, it fa tloubtful that a court would hold 
that it embodies any limitation upon the Commissioner's discretion to refuse to rule, 
Ibid. Furthermore, at least one court has held that a refusal to issue a declaratory order 
is not a final order susceptible to review. United Pipe Line v. FPC, 203 F.2d 78 (5th 
Cir. 1953). Finally, courts have historically been reluctant to issue writs of mandamus 
in discretionary areas. See generally Davis, Mandatory Relief From Administrative 
Action in the Federal Courts, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 585 (1955). The author of the Note, 
113 U. PA. L. R.Ev., supra, suggests that as an alternative a trucpayer could go before 
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of waiting 2½ -years, had promptly rejected IBM's request for· a 
private ruling but continued to offer Remington favorable treatment, 
or if the Commissioner had simply refused to rule, there would 
appear to be no basis upon which to argue that IBM had been 
subjected to the retroactive effects of a ruling, yet IBM would have 
been subjected to discriminatory taxation. 
By allowing IBM to recover because Remington had received 
a favorable private ruling, the Court of Claims has established an 
exception to the general concept that a private ruling affects only 
the taxpayer to whom it is issued.16 Consequently, the Commissioner 
may find that by issuing a private ruling to a single individual, he 
will become bound to numerous other taxpayers requesting similar 
treatment. Such a result may be equitably sound, but before it is 
too vigorously applauded courts should carefully consider its prob-
able adverse effect on the pre-transactional guidance role of private 
rulings.17 Because of high tax rates and the complexity of tax 
statutes, taxpayers frequently hesitate to consummate important 
business transactions without official assurance of the tax conse-
quences.18 Therefore, a great number of requests for private rulings 
are received by the Internal Revenue Service,19 and the necessity 
for a prompt reply limits the scope of review allotted to each ruling, 
thereby increasing the chance that an interpretation will be errone-
ous.20 If the effect of such errors is no longer to be limited solely to 
the recipients of the erroneous rulings, the Service may not be as 
willing to rule, particularly in the more difficult cases, where rulings 
generally are of the greatest value. 
To avoid posing this obstacle to the issuance of private rulings, 
courts should require that the taxpayer alleging discrimination prove 
more than that the Commissioner has not ruled favorably as to him 
but has ruled favorably as to other taxpayers similarly situated. The 
complaining taxpayer should further be required to show that the 
the Tax Court and ask for a declaratory order under § 5(d) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1964). The effect of this ap-
proach would not be to compel the Commissioner to rule, but for the Tax Court itself 
to rule upon the issue and thereby "remove uncertainty" created by the Commissioner's 
refusal to rule. 
16. See cases cited note 9 supra. 
17. Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127, 132 (1st Cir. 1959); Caplin, Taxpayer 
Rulings Policy of the" Internal Revenue Service: A Statement of Principles, N.Y.U. 
20TH INsr. ON FED. TAX. 1, 26-29 (1962); Note, 113 u. PA. L. REv. 81, 108 (1964); cf. 
Wolinsky v. United States, 271 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1959); Arnold A. Schwartz, 40 
T.C. 191, 194 (1963). 
18. Rev. Proc. 30, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 944; Caplin, supra note 17; Note, 113 U. PA. L. 
REv. 81, 84 (1964). 
19. The Service receives about 30,000 to 40,000 requests annually. Caplin, supra 
note 17, at 9. 
20. Caplin, supra note 17; see Int. Rev. Service News Rel., May 21, 1964, 7 STAND. 
FED. TAX REP. CCH 1f 6610. 
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Commissioner's handling of his request was so careless or blatantly
arbitrary that equitable considerations clearly outweigh the need
for limiting application of the favorable rulings to their recipients.
However, since section 7805(b) is not designed to remedy discrimina-
tion, it offers no guarantee that the courts will impose the suggested
stringent burden. Thus, the responsibility for policing discrimina-
tory rulings must be assumed by the Commissioner. It is to be
hoped that the Commissioner will take necessary precautions to
avoid discrimination caused by wholly unjustifiable delays in issu-
ance of rulings like the 21/2-year delay to which IBM was sub-
jected 21 -especially in cases where there is the possibility of a sub-
stantial excise tax discrepancy. 22 If administrative control does not
prove effective, section 7805 should be legislatively expanded to pro-
vide the judiciary with appropriate guidelines for remedying dis-
criminatory dispensation of rulings. The expanded statute should
allow recovery where the taxpayer has, as in the principal case,
requested a ruling, and where the Commissioner's failure to issue a
favorable ruling results in discrimination which is both "intentional
and arbitrary."' 3
21. For example, the Commissioner might establish a policy that all delays of one
year will be ended by a favorable ruling.
22. The framers of the revised excise tax enacted as a part of the Revenue Act of
1932 adverted to the problem of competitive misalignment that could result from
uneven administration of the tax. The House Ways and Means Committee noted that
"it is of utmost importance that the tax be imposed and administered uniformly and
without discrimination." H.R. RP. No. 708, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 31, 32 (1932).
23. The Supreme Court requires that alleged instances of discriminatory state
taxation be intentional and arbitrary before the Court will find a violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota
County, 260 U.S. 441, 447 (1923). See also Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326
U.S. 620, 623 (1946).
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